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Using Risk Management Standards: A Q&A with Ben Tomhave, Security Architect and Former Gartner Analyst

By The Open Group

IT Risk Management is currently in a state of flux with many organizations today unsure not only how to best assess risk but also how to place it within the context of their business. Ben Tomhave, a Security Architect and former Gartner analyst, will be speaking at The Open Group Baltimore on July 20 on “The Strengths and Limitations of Risk Management Standards.”

We recently caught up with Tomhave pre-conference to discuss the pros and cons of today’s Risk Management standards, the issues that organizations are facing when it comes to Risk Management and how they can better use existing standards to their advantage.

How would you describe the state of Risk Management and Risk Management standards today?

The topic of my talk is really on the state of standards for Security and Risk Management. There’s a handful of significant standards out there today, varying from some of the work at The Open Group to NIST and the ISO 27000 series, etc. The problem with most of those is that they don’t necessarily provide a prescriptive level of guidance for how to go about performing or structuring risk management within an organization. If you look at ISO 31000 for example, it provides a general guideline for how to structure an overall Risk Management approach or program but it’s not designed to be directly implementable. You can then look at something like ISO 27005 that provides a bit more detail, but for the most part these are fairly high-level guides on some of the key components; they don’t get to the point of how you should be doing Risk Management.

In contrast, one can look at something like the Open FAIR standard from The Open Group, and that gets a bit more prescriptive and directly implementable, but even then there’s a fair amount of scoping and education that needs to go on. So the short answer to the question is, there’s no shortage of documented guidance out there, but there are, however, still a lot of open-ended questions and a lot of misunderstanding about how to use these.

What are some of the limitations that are hindering risk standards then and what needs to be added?

I don’t think it’s necessarily a matter of needing to fix or change the standards themselves, I think where we’re at is that we’re still at a fairly prototypical stage where we have guidance as to how to get started and how to structure things but we don’t necessarily have really good understanding across the industry about how to best make use of it. Complicating things further is an open question about just how much we need to be doing, how much value can we get from these, do we need to adopt some of these practices? If you look at all of the organizations that have had major breaches over the past few years, all of them, presumably, were doing some form of risk management—probably qualitative Risk Management—and yet they still had all these breaches anyway. Inevitably, they were compliant with any number of security standards along the way, too, and yet bad things happen. We have a lot of issues with how organizations are using standards less than with the standards themselves.

Last fall The Open Group fielded an IT Risk Management survey that found that many organizations are struggling to understand and create business value for Risk Management. What you’re saying really echoes those results. How much of this has to do with problems within organizations themselves and not having a better understanding of Risk Management?

I think that’s definitely the case. A lot of organizations are making bad decisions in many areas right now, and they don’t know why or aren’t even aware and are making bad decisions up until the point it’s too late. As an industry we’ve got this compliance problem where you can do a lot of work and demonstrate completion or compliance with check lists and still be compromised, still have massive data breaches. I think there’s a significant cognitive dissonance that exists, and I think it’s because we’re still in a significant transitional period overall.

Security should really have never been a standalone industry or a standalone environment. Security should have just been one of those attributes of the operating system or operating environments from the outset. Unfortunately, because of the dynamic nature of IT (and we’re still going through what I refer to as this Digital Industrial Revolution that’s been going on for 40-50 years), everything’s changing everyday. That will be the case until we hit a stasis point that we can stabilize around and grow a generation that’s truly native with practices and approaches and with the tools and technologies underlying this stuff.

An analogy would be to look at Telecom. Look at Telecom in the 1800s when they were running telegraph poles and running lines along railroad tracks. You could just climb a pole, put a couple alligator clips on there and suddenly you could send and receive messages, too, using the same wires. Now we have buried lines, we have much greater integrity of those systems. We generally know when we’ve lost integrity on those systems for the most part. It took 100 years to get there. So we’re less than half that way with the Internet and things are a lot more complicated, and the ability of an attacker, one single person spending all their time to go after a resource or a target, that type of asymmetric threat is just something that we haven’t really thought about and engineered our environments for over time.

I think it’s definitely challenging. But ultimately Risk Management practices are about making better decisions. How do we put the right amount of time and energy into making these decisions and providing better information and better data around those decisions? That’s always going to be a hard question to answer. Thinking about where the standards really could stand to improve, it’s helping organizations, helping people, understand the answer to that core question—which is, how much time and energy do I have to put into this decision?

When I did my graduate work at George Washington University, a number of years ago, one of the courses we had to take went through decision management as a discipline. We would run through things like decision trees. I went back to the executives at the company that I was working at and asked them, ‘How often do you use decision trees to make your investment decisions?” And they just looked at me funny and said, ‘Gosh, we haven’t heard of or thought about decision trees since grad school.’ In many ways, a lot of the formal Risk Management stuff that we talk about and drill into—especially when you get into the quantitative risk discussions—a lot of that goes down the same route. It’s great academically, it’s great in theory, but it’s not the kind of thing where on a daily basis you need to pull it out and use it for every single decision or every single discussion. Which, by the way, is where the FAIR taxonomy within Open FAIR provides an interesting and very valuable breakdown point. There are many cases where just using the taxonomy to break down a problem and think about it a little bit is more than sufficient, and you don’t have to go the next step of populating it with the actual quantitative estimates and do the quantitative estimations for a FAIR risk analysis. You can use it qualitatively and improve the overall quality and defensibility of your decisions.

How mature are most organizations in their understanding of risk today, and what are some of the core reasons they’re having such a difficult time with Risk Management?

The answer to that question varies to a degree by industry. Industries like financial services just seem to deal with this stuff better for the most part, but then if you look at multibillion dollar write offs for JP Morgan Chase, you think maybe they don’t understand risk after all. I think for the most part most large enterprises have at least some people in the organization that have a nominal understanding of Risk Management and risk assessment and how that factors into making good decisions.

That doesn’t mean that everything’s perfect. Look at the large enterprises that had major breaches in 2014 and 2013 and clearly you can look at those and say ‘Gosh, you guys didn’t make very good decisions.’ Home Depot is a good example or even the NSA with the Snowden stuff. In both cases, they knew they had an exposure, they had done a reasonable job of risk management, they just didn’t move fast enough with their remediation. They just didn’t get stuff in place soon enough to make a meaningful difference.

For the most part, larger enterprises or organizations will have better facilities and capabilities around risk management, but they may have challenges with velocity in terms of being able to put to rest issues in a timely fashion. Now slip down to different sectors and you look at retail, they continue to have issues with cardholder data and that’s where the card brands are asserting themselves more aggressively. Look at healthcare. Healthcare organizations, for one thing, simply don’t have the budget or the control to make a lot of changes, and they’re well behind the curve in terms of protecting patient records and data. Then look at other spaces like SMBs, which make up more than 90 percent of U.S. employment firms or look at the education space where they simply will never have the kinds of resources to do everything that’s expected of them.

I think we have a significant challenge here – a lot of these organizations will never have the resources to have adequate Risk Management in-house, and they will always be tremendously resource-constrained, preventing them from doing all that they really need to do. The challenge for them is, how do we provide answers or tools or methods to them that they can then use that don’t require a lot of expertise but can guide them toward making better decisions overall even if the decision is ‘Why are we doing any of this IT stuff at all when we can simply be outsourcing this to a service that specializes in my industry or specializes in my SMB business size that can take on some of the risk for me that I wasn’t even aware of?’

It ends up being a very basic educational awareness problem in many regards, and many of these organizations don’t seem to be fully aware of the type of exposure and legal liability that they’re carrying at any given point in time.

One of the other IT Risk Management Survey findings was that where the Risk Management function sits in organizations is pretty inconsistent—sometimes IT, sometimes risk, sometimes security—is that part of the problem too?

Yes and no—it’s a hard question to answer directly because we have to drill in on what kind of Risk Management we’re talking about. Because there’s enterprise Risk Management reporting up to a CFO or CEO, and one could argue that the CEO is doing Risk Management.

One of the problems that we historically run into, especially from a bottom-up perspective, is a lot of IT Risk Management people or IT Risk Management professionals or folks from the audit world have mistakenly thought that everything should boil down to a single, myopic view of ‘What is risk?’ And yet it’s really not how executives run organizations. Your chief exec, your board, your CFO, they’re not looking at performance on a single number every day. They’re looking at a portfolio of risk and how different factors are balancing out against everything. So it’s really important for folks in Op Risk Management and IT Risk Management to really truly understand and make sure that they’re providing a portfolio view up the chain that adequately represents the state of the business, which typically will represent multiple lines of business, multiple systems, multiple environments, things like that.

I think one of the biggest challenges we run into is just in an ill-conceived desire to provide value that’s oversimplified. We end up hyper-aggregating results and data, and suddenly everything boils down to a stop light that IT today is either red, yellow or green. That’s not really particularly informative, and it doesn’t help you make better decisions. How can I make better investment decisions around IT systems if all I know is that today things are yellow? I think it comes back to the educational awareness topic. Maybe people aren’t always best placed within organizations but really it’s more about how they’re representing the data and whether they’re getting it into the right format that’s most accessible to that audience.

What should organizations look for in choosing risk standards?

I usually get a variety of questions and they’re all about risk assessment—‘Oh, we need to do risk assessment’ and ‘We hear about this quant risk assessment thing that sounds really cool, where do we get started?’ Inevitably, it comes down to, what’s your actual Risk Management process look like? Do you actually have a context for making decisions, understanding the business context, etc.? And the answer more often than not is no, there is no actual Risk Management process. I think really where people can leverage the standards is understanding what the overall risk management process looks like or can look like and in constructing that, making sure they identify the right stakeholders overall and then start to drill down to specifics around impact analysis, actual risk analysis around remediation and recovery. All of these are important components but they have to exist within the broader context and that broader context has to functionally plug into the organization in a meaningful, measurable manner. I think that’s really where a lot of the confusion ends up occurring. ‘Hey I went to this conference, I heard about this great thing, how do I make use of it?’ People may go through certification training but if they don’t know how to go back to their organization and put that into practice not just on a small-scale decision basis, but actually going in and plugging it into a larger Risk Management process, it will never really demonstrate a lot of value.

The other piece of the puzzle that goes along with this, too, is you can’t just take these standards and implement them verbatim; they’re not designed to do that. You have to spend some time understanding the organization, the culture of the organization and what will work best for that organization. You have to really get to know people and use these things to really drive conversations rather than hoping that one of these risk assessments results will have some meaningful impact at some point.

How can organizations get more value from Risk Management and risk standards?

Starting with latter first, the value of the Risk Management standards is that you don’t have to start from scratch, you don’t have to reinvent the wheel. There are, in fact, very consistent and well-conceived approaches to structuring risk management programs and conducting risk assessment and analysis. That’s where the power of the standards come from, from establishing a template or guideline for establishing things.

The challenge of course is you have to have it well-grounded within the organization. In order to get value from a Risk Management program, it has to be part of daily operations. You have to plug it into things like procurement cycles and other similar types of decision cycles so that people aren’t just making gut decisions based off whatever their existing biases are.

One of my favorite examples is password complexity requirements. If you look back at the ‘best practice’ standards requirements over the years, going all the way back to the Orange Book in the 80s or the Rainbow Series which came out of the federal government, they tell you ‘oh, you have to have 8-character passwords and they have to have upper case, lower, numbers, special characters, etc.’ The funny thing is that while that was probably true in 1985, that is probably less true today. When we actually do risk analysis to look at the problem, and understand what the actual scenario is that we’re trying to guard against, password complexity ends up causing more problems than it solves because what we’re really protecting against is a brute force attack against a log-in interface or guessability on a log-in interface. Or maybe we’re trying to protect against a password database being compromised and getting decrypted. Well, password complexity has nothing to do with solving how that data is protected in storage. So why would we look at something like password complexity requirements as some sort of control against compromise of a database that may or may not be encrypted?

This is where Risk Management practices come into play because you can use Risk Management and risk assessment techniques to look at a given scenario—whether it be technology decisions or security control decisions, administrative or technical controls—we can look at this and say what exactly are we trying to protect against, what problem are we trying to solve? And then based on our understanding of that scenario, let’s look at the options that we can apply to achieve an appropriate degree of protection for the organization.

That ultimately is what we should be trying to achieve with Risk Management. Unfortunately, that’s usually not what we see implemented. A lot of the time, what’s described as risk management is really just an extension of audit practices and issuing a bunch of surveys, questionnaires, asking a lot of questions but never really putting it into a proper business context. Then we see a lot of bad practices applied, and we start seeing a lot of math-magical practices come in where we take categorical data—high, medium, low, more or less, what’s the impact to the business? A lot, a little—we take these categorical labels and suddenly start assigning numerical values to them and doing arithmetic calculations on them, and this is a complete violation of statistical principles. You shouldn’t be doing that at all. By definition, you don’t do arithmetic on categorical data, and yet that’s what a lot of these alleged Risk Management and risk assessment programs are doing.

I think Risk Management gets a bad rap as a result of these poor practices. Conducting a survey, asking questions is not a risk assessment. A risk assessment is taking a scenario, looking at the business impact analysis for that scenario, looking at the risk tolerance, what the risk capacity is for that scenario, and then looking at what the potential threats and weaknesses are within that scenario that could negatively impact the business. That’s a risk assessment. Asking people a bunch of questions about ‘Do you have passwords? Do you use complex passwords? Have you hardened the server? Are there third party people involved?’ That’s interesting information but it’s not usually reflective of the risk state and ultimately we want to find out what the risk state is.

How do you best determine that risk state?

If you look at any of the standards—and again this is where the standards do provide some value—if you look at what a Risk Management process is and the steps that are involved in it, take for example ISO 31000—step one is establishing context, which includes establishing potential business impact or business importance, business priority for applications and data, also what the risk tolerance, risk capacity is for a given scenario. That’s your first step. Then the risk assessment step is taking that data and doing additional analysis around that scenario.

In the technical context, that’s looking at how secure is this environment, what’s the exposure of the system, who has access to it, how is the data stored or protected? From that analysis, you can complete the assessment by saying ‘Given that this is a high value asset, there’s sensitive data in here, but maybe that data is strongly encrypted and access controls have multiple layers of defense, etc., the relative risk here of a compromise or attack being successful is fairly low.’ Or ‘We did this assessment, and we found in the application that we could retrieve data even though it was supposedly stored in an encrypted state, so we could end up with a high risk statement around the business impact, we’re looking at material loss,’ or something like that.

Pulling all of these pieces together is really key, and most importantly, you cannot skip over context setting. If you don’t ever do context setting, and establish the business importance, nothing else ends up mattering. Just because a system has a vulnerability doesn’t mean that it’s a material risk to the business. And you can’t even know that unless you establish the context.

In terms of getting started, leveraging the standards makes a lot of sense, but not from a perspective of this is a compliance check list that I’m going to use verbatim. You have to use it as a structured process, you have to get some training and get educated on how these things work and then what requirements you have to meet and then do what makes sense for the organizational role. At the end of the day, there’s no Easy Button for these things, you have to invest some time and energy and build something that makes sense and is functional for your organization.

To download the IT Risk Management survey summary, please click here.

By The Open GroupFormer Gartner analyst Ben Tomhave (MS, CISSP) is Security Architect for a leading online education organization where he is putting theories into practice. He holds a Master of Science in Engineering Management (Information Security Management concentration) from The George Washington University, and is a member and former co-chair of the American Bar Association Information Security Committee, senior member of ISSA, former board member of the Northern Virginia OWASP chapter, and member and former board member for the Society of Information Risk Analysts. He is a published author and an experienced public speaker, including recent speaking engagements with the RSA Conference, the ISSA International Conference, Secure360, RVAsec, RMISC, and several Gartner events.

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Cybersecurity Standards: The Open Group Explores Security and Ways to Assure Safer Supply Chains

Following is a transcript of part of the proceedings from The Open Group San Diego 2015 in February.

The following presentations and panel discussion, which together examine the need and outlook for Cybersecurity standards amid supply chains, are provided by moderator Dave Lounsbury, Chief Technology Officer, The Open Group; Mary Ann Davidson, Chief Security Officer, Oracle; Dr. Ron Ross, Fellow of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and Jim Hietala, Vice President of Security for The Open Group.

Here are some excerpts:

By The Open GroupDave Lounsbury: Mary Ann Davidson is responsible for Oracle Software Security Assurance and represents Oracle on the Board of Directors for the Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and on the international Board of the ISSA.

Dr. Ron Ross leads the Federal Information Security Management Act Implementation Project. It sounds like a big job to fulfill, developing the security standards and guidelines for the federal government.

This session is going to look at the cybersecurity and supply chain landscape from a standards perspective. So Ron and Mary Ann, thank you very much.

By The Open GroupRon Ross: All of us are part of the technology explosion and revolution that we have been experiencing for the last couple of decades.

I would like to have you leave today with a couple of major points, at least from my presentation, things that we have observed in cybersecurity for the last 25 years: where we are today and where I think we might need to go in the future. There is no right or wrong answer to this problem of cybersecurity. It’s probably one of the most difficult and challenging sets of problems we could ever experience.

In our great country, we work on what I call the essential partnership. It’s a combination of government, industry, and academia all working together. We have the greatest technology producers, not just in this country, but around the world, who are producing some fantastic things to which we are all “addicted.” I think we have an addiction to the technology.

Some of the problems we’re going to experience going forward in cybersecurity aren’t just going to be technology problems. They’re going to be cultural problems and organizational problems. The key issue is how we organize ourselves, what our risk tolerance is, how we are going to be able to accomplish all of our critical missions and business operations that Dawn talked about this morning, and do so in a world that’s fairly dangerous. We have to protect ourselves.

Movie App

I think I can sum it up. I was at a movie. I don’t go to movies very often anymore, but about a month ago, I went to a movie. I was sitting there waiting for the main movie to start, and they were going through all the coming attractions. Then they came on the PA and they said that there is an app you can download. I’m not sure you have ever seen this before, but it tells you for that particular movie when is the optimal time to go to the restroom during the movie.

I bring this up because that’s a metaphor for where we are today. We are consumed. There are great companies out there, producing great technologies. We’re buying it up faster than you can shake a stick at it, and we are developing the most complicated IT infrastructure ever.

So when I look at this problem, I look at this from a scientist’s point of view, an engineering point of view. I’m saying to myself, knowing what I know about what it takes  to — I don’t even use the word “secure” anymore, because I don’t think we can ever get there with the current complexity — build the most secure systems we can and be able to manage risk in the world that we live in.

In the Army, we used to have a saying. You go to war with the army that you have, not the army that you want. We’ve heard about all the technology advances, and we’re going to be buying stuff, commercial stuff, and we’re going to have to put it together into systems. Whether it’s the Internet of Things (IoT) or cyber-physical convergence, it all goes back to some fairly simple things.

The IoT and all this stuff that we’re talking about today really gets back to computers. That’s the common denominator. They’re everywhere. This morning, we talked about your automobile having more compute power than Apollo 11. In your toaster, your refrigerator, your building, the control of the temperature, industrial control systems in power plants, manufacturing plants, financial institutions, the common denominator is the computer, driven by firmware and software.

When you look at the complexity of the things that we’re building today, we’ve gone past the time when we can actually understand what we have and how to secure it.

That’s one of the things that we’re going to do at NIST this year and beyond. We’ve been working in the FISMA world forever it seems, and we have a whole set of standards, and that’s the theme of today: how can standards help you build a more secure enterprise?

The answer is that we have tons of standards out there and we have lots of stuff, whether it’s on the federal side with 853 or the Risk Management Framework, or all the great things that are going on in the standards world, with The Open Group, or ISO, pick your favorite standard.

The real question is how we use those standards effectively to change the current outlook and what we are experiencing today because of this complexity? The adversary has a significant advantage in this world, because of complexity. They really can pick the time, the place, and the type of attack, because the attack surface is so large when you talk about not just the individual products.

We have many great companies just in this country and around the world that are doing a lot to make those products more secure. But then they get into the engineering process and put them together in a system, and that really is an unsolved problem. We call it a Composability Problem. I can have a trusted product here and one here, but what is the combination of those two when you put them together in the systems context? We haven’t solved that problem yet, and it’s getting more complicated everyday.

Continuous Monitoring

For the hard problems, we in the federal government do a lot of stuff in continuous monitoring. We’re going around counting our boxes and we are patching stuff and we are configuring our components. That’s loosely called cyber hygiene. It’s very important to be able to do all that and do it quickly and efficiently to make your systems as secure as they need to be.

But even the security controls in our control catalog, 853, when you get into the technical controls —  I’m talking about access control mechanisms, identification, authentication, encryption, and audit — those things are buried in the hardware, the software, the firmware, and the applications.

Most of our federal customers can’t even see those. So when I ask them if they have all their access controls in place, they can nod their head yes, but they can’t really prove that in a meaningful way.

So we have to rely on industry to make sure those mechanisms, those functions, are employed within the component products that we then will put together using some engineering process.

This is the below-the-waterline problem I talk about. We’re in some kind of digital denial today, because below the water line, most consumers are looking at their smartphones, their tablets, and all their apps — that’s why I used that movie example — and they’re not really thinking about those vulnerabilities, because they can’t see them, until it affects them personally.

I had to get three new credit cards last year. I shop at Home Depot and Target, and JPMorgan Chase is our federal credit card. That’s not a pain point for me because I’m indemnified. Even if there are fraudulent charges, I don’t get hit for those.

If your identity is stolen, that’s a personal pain point. We haven’t reached that national pain point yet. All of the security stuff that we do we talk about it a lot and we do a lot of it, but if you really want to effect change, you’re going to start to hear more at this conference about assurance, trustworthiness, and resiliency. That’s the world that we want to build and we are not there today.

That’s the essence of where I am hoping we are going to go. It’s these three areas: software assurance, systems security engineering, and supply-chain risk management.

My colleague Jon Boyens is here today and he is the author, along with a very talented team of coauthors, of the NIST 800-161 document. That’s the supply chain risk document.

It’s going to work hand-in-hand with another publication that we’re still working on, the 800-160 document. We are taking an IEEE and an ISO standard, 15288, and we’re trying to infuse into that standard. They are coming out with the update of that standard this year. We’re trying to infuse security into every step of the lifecycle.

Wrong Reasons

The reason why we are not having a lot of success on the cybersecurity front today is because security ends up appearing either too late or by the wrong people for the wrong reasons.

I’ll give you one example. In the federal government, we have a huge catalog of security controls, and they are allocated into different baselines: low, moderate, and high. So you will pick a baseline, you will tailor, and you’ll come to the system owner or the authorizing official and say, “These are all the controls that NIST says we have to do.” Well, the mission business owner was never involved in that discussion.

One of the things we are going to do with the new document is focus on the software and systems engineering process from the start of the stakeholders, all the way through requirements, analysis, definition, design, development, implementation, operation, and sustainment, all the way to disposal. Critical things are going to happen at every one of those places in the lifecycle

The beauty of that process is that you involve the stakeholders early. So when those security controls are actually selected they can be traced back to a specific security requirement, which is part of a larger set of requirements that support that mission or business operation, and now you have the stakeholders involved in the process.

Up to this point in time, security operates in its own vacuum. It’s in the little office down the hall, and we go down there whenever there’s a problem. But unless and until security gets integrated and we disappear as being our own discipline, we now are part of the Enterprise Architecture, whether it’s TOGAF® or whatever architecture construct you are following, or the systems engineering process. The system development lifecycle is the third one, and people ask what is acquisition and procurement.

Unless we have our stakeholders at those tables to influence, we are going to continue to deploy systems that are largely indefensible not against all cyber attacks but against the high-end attacks.

We have to do a better job getting at the C-Suite and I tried to capture the five essential areas that this discussion has to revolve around. The acronym is TACIT, and it just happens to be a happy coincidence that it fit into an acronym. But it’s basically looking at the threat, how you configure your assets, and how you categorize your assets with regard to criticality.

How complex is the system you’re building? Are you managing that complexity in trying to reduce it, integrating security across the entire set of business practices within the organization? Then, the last component, which really ties into The Open Group, and the things you’re doing here with all the projects that were described in the first session, that is the trustworthiness piece.

Are we building products and systems that are, number one, more penetration resistance to cyber attacks; and number two, since we know we can’t stop all attacks, because we can never reduce complexity to where we thought we could two or three decades ago. Are we building the essential resiliency into that system. Even when the adversary comes to the boundary and the malware starts to work, how far does it spread, and what can it do?

That’s the key question. You try to limit the time on target for the advisory, and that can be done very, very easily with good architectural and good engineering solutions. That’s my message for 2015 and beyond, at least from a lot of things at NIST. We’re going to start focusing on the architecture and the engineering, how to really affect things at the ground level?

Processes are Important

Now we always will have the people, the processes, the technologies kind of this whole ecosystem that we have to deal with, and you’re going to always have to worry about your sys admins that go bad and dump all the stuff that you don’t want dumped on the Internet. But that’s part of system process. Processes are very important because they give us structure, discipline, and the ability to communicate with our partners.

I was talking to Rob Martin from Mitre. He’s working on a lot of important projects there with the CWEs, CVEs. It gives you the ability to communicate a level of trustworthiness and assurance that other people can have that dialogue, because without that, we’re not going to be communicating with each other. We’re not going to trust each other, and that’s critical, having that common understanding. Frameworks provide that common dialogue of security controls in a common process, how we build things, and what is the level of risk that we are willing to accept in that whole process.

These slides, and they’ll be available, go very briefly into the five areas. Understanding the modern threat today is critical because, even if you don’t have access to classified threat data, there’s a lot of great data out there with Symantec and Verizon reports, and there’s open-source threat information available.

If you haven’t had a chance to do that, I know the folks who work on the high assurance stuff in The Open Group RT&ES. look at that stuff a lot, because they’re building a capability that is intended to stop some of those types of threats.

The other thing about assets is that we don’t do a very good job of criticality analysis. In other words, most of our systems are running, processing, storing, and transmitting data and we’re not segregating the critical data into its own domain where necessary.

I know that’s hard to do sometimes. People say, “I’ve got to have all this stuff ready to go 24×7,” but when you look at some of the really bad breaches that we have had over the last several years establishing a domain for critical data, where that domain can be less complex, which means you can better defend it, and then you can invest more resources into defending those things that are the most critical.

I used a very simple example of a safe deposit box. I can’t get all my stuff into the safe deposit box. So I have to make decisions. I put important papers in there, maybe a coin collection, whatever.  I have locks on my house on the front door, but they’re not strong enough to stop some of those bad guys out there. So I make those decisions. I put it in the bank, and it goes in a vault. It’s a pain in the butt to go down there and get the stuff out, but it gives me more assurance, greater trustworthiness. That’s an example of the things we have to be able to do.

Complexity is something that’s going to be very difficult to address because of our penchant for bringing in new technologies. Make no mistake about it, these are great technologies. They are compelling. They are making us more efficient. They are allowing us to do things we never imagined, like finding out the optimal time to go to the restroom during a movie, I mean who could have imagined we could do that a decade ago.

But as with every one of our customers out there, the kinds of things we’re talking about flies below their radar. When you download 100 apps on your smartphone, people in general, even the good folks in Cybersecurity, have no idea where those apps are coming from, where the pedigree is, have they been tested at all, have they been evaluated, are they running on a trusted operating system?

Ultimately, that’s what this business is all about, and that’s what 800-161 is all about. It’s about a lifecycle of the entire stack from applications, to middleware, to operating systems, to firmware, to integrated circuits, to include the supply chain.

The adversary is all over that stack. They now figure out how to compromise our firmware so we have to come up with firmware integrity controls in our control catalog, and that’s the world we live in today.

Managing Complexity

I was smiling this morning when I talked about the DNI, the Director of National Intelligence in building their cloud, if that’s going to go to the public cloud or not. I think Dawn is probably right, you probably won’t see that going to the public cloud anytime soon, but cloud computing gives us an opportunity to manage complexity. You can figure out what you want to send to the public cloud.

They do a good job through the FedRAMP program of deploying controls and they’ve got a business model that’s important to make sure they protect their customers’ assets. So that’s built into their business model and they do a lot of great things out there to try to protect that information.

Then, for whatever stays behind in your enterprise, you can start to employ some of the architectural constructs that you’ll see here at this conference, some of the security engineering constructs that we’re going to talk about in 800-160, and you can better defend what stays behind within your organization.

So cloud is a way to reduce that complexity. Enterprise Architecture, TOGAF®, an Open Group standard, all of those architectural things allow you to provide discipline and structure and thinking about what you’re building: how to protect it, how much it’s going to cost and is it worth it? That is the essence of good security. It’s not about running around with a barrel full of security controls or ISO 27000 saying, hey, you’ve got to do all this stuff, or this guy is going to fall, those days are over.

Integration we talked about. This is also hard. We are working with stovepipes today. Enterprise Architects typically don’t talk to security people. Acquisition folks, in most cases, don’t talk to security people.

I see it everyday. You see RFPs go out and there is a whole long list of requirements, and then, when it comes to security, they say the system or the product they are buying must be FISMA compliant. They know that’s a law and they know they have to do that, but they really don’t give the industry or the potential contractors any specificity as to what they need to do to bring that product or the system to the state where it needs to be.

And so it’s all about expectations. I believe our industry, whether it’s here or overseas, wherever these great companies operate, the one thing we can be sure of is that they want to please their customers. So maybe what the message I’m going to send everyday is that we have to be more informed consumers. We have to ask for things that we know we need.

It’s like if you go back with the automobile. When I first started driving a long time ago,  40 years ago, cars just had seatbelts. There were no airbags and no steel-reinforced doors. Then, you could actually buy an airbag as an option at some point. When you fast-forward to today, every car has an airbag, seatbelt, steel-reinforced doors. It comes as part of the basic product. We don’t have to ask for it, but as consumers we know it’s there, and it’s important to us.

We have to start to look at the IT business in the same way, just like when we cross a bridge or fly in an airplane. All of you who flew here in airplanes and came across bridges had confidence in those structures. Why? Because they are built with good scientific and engineering practices.

So least functionality, least privilege, those are kind of foundational concepts in our world and cybersecurity. You really can’t look at a smartphone or a tablet and talk about least functionality anymore, at least if you are running that movie app, and you want to have all of that capability.

The last point about trustworthiness is that we have four decades of best practices in trusted systems development. It failed 30 years ago because we had the vision back then of trusted operating systems, but the technology and the development far outstripped our ability to actually achieve that.

Increasingly Difficult

We talked about a kernel-based operating system having 2,000, 3,000, 4,000, 5,000 lines of code and being highly trusted. Well, those concepts are still in place. It’s just that now the operating systems are 50 million lines of code, and so it becomes increasingly difficult.

And this is the key thing. As a society, we’re going to have to figure out, going forward, with all this great technology, what kind of world do we want to have for ourselves and our grandchildren? Because with all this technology, as good as it is, if we can’t provide a basis of security and privacy that customers can feel comfortable with, then at some point this party is going to stop.

I don’t know when that time is going to come, but I call it the national pain point in this digital denial. We will come to that steady state. We just haven’t had enough time yet to get to that balance point, but I’m sure we will.

I talked about the essential partnership, but I don’t think we can solve any problem without a collaborative approach, and that’s why I use the essential partnership: government, industry, and academia.

Certainly all of the innovation, or most of the innovation, comes from our great industry. Academia is critical, because the companies like Oracle or Microsoft want to hire students who have been educated in what I call the STEM disciplines: Science, Technology, Engineering — whether it’s “double e” or computer science — and Mathematics. They need those folks to be able to build the kind of products that have the capabilities, function-wise, and also are trusted.

And government plays some role — maybe some leadership, maybe a bully pulpit, cheerleading where we can — bringing things together. But the bottom line is that we have to work together, and I believe that we’ll do that. And when that happens I think all of us will be able to sit in that movie and fire up that app about the restroom and feel good that it’s secure.

By The Open GroupMary Ann Davidson: I guess I’m preaching to the converted, if I can use a religious example without offending somebody. One of the questions you asked is, why do we even have standards in this area? And of course some of them are for technical reasons. Crypto it turns out is easy for even very smart people to get wrong. Unfortunately, we have reason to find out.

So there is technical correctness. Another reason would be interoperability to get things to work better in a more secure manner. I’ve worked in this industry long enough to remember the first SSL implementation, woo-hoo, and then it turns out 40 bits wasn’t really 40, bits because it wasn’t random enough, shall we say.

Trustworthiness. ISO has a standard — The Common Criteria. It’s an ISO standard. We talk about what does it mean to have secure software, what type of threats does it address, how do you prove that it does what you say you do? There are standards for that, which helps. It helps everybody. It certainly helps buyers understand a little bit more about what they’re getting.

No Best Practices

And last, but not least, and the reason it’s in quotes, “best practices,” is because there actually are no best practices. Why do I say that — and I am seeing furrowed brows back there? First of all, lawyers don’t like them in contracts, because then if you are not doing the exact thing, you get sued.

There are good practices and there are worst practices. There typically isn’t one thing that everyone can do exactly the same way that’s going to be the best practice. So that’s why that’s in quotation marks.

Generally speaking, I do think standards, particularly in general, can be a force for good in the universe, particularly in cybersecurity, but they are not always a force for good, depending on other factors.

And what is the ecosystem? Well, we have a lot of people. We have standards makers, people who work on them. Some of them are people who review things. Like when NIST is very good, which I appreciate, about putting drafts out and taking comments, as opposed to saying, “Here it is, take it or leave it.” That’s actually a very constructive dialogue, which I believe a lot of people appreciate. I know that I do.

Sometimes there are mandators. You’ll get an RFP that says, “Verily, thou shall comply with this, less thee be an infidel in the security realm.” And that can be positive. It can  be a leading edge of getting people to do something good that, in many cases, they should do anyway.

Implementers, who have to take this and decipher and figure out why they are doing it. People who make sure that you actually did what you said you were going to do.

And last, but not least, there are weaponizers. What do I mean by that? We all know who they are. They are people who will try to develop a standard and then get it mandated. Actually, it isn’t a standard. It’s something they came up with, which might be very good, but it’s handing them regulatory capture.

And we need to be aware of those people. I like the Oracle database. I have to say that, right? There are a lot of other good databases out there. If I went in and said, purely objectively speaking, everybody should standardize on the Oracle database, because it’s the most secure. Well, nice work if I can get it.

Is that in everybody else’s interest? Probably not. You get better products in something that is not a monopoly market. Competition is good.

So I have an MBA, or had one in a prior life, and they used to talk in the marketing class about the three Ps of marketing. Don’t know what they are anymore; it’s been a while. So I thought I would come up with Four Ps of a Benevolent Standard, which are Problem Statement, Precise Language, Pragmatic Solutions, and Prescriptive Minimization.

Economic Analysis

And the reason I say this is one of the kind of discussions I have to have a lot of times, particularly sometimes with people in the government. I’m not saying this in any pejorative way. So please don’t take it that way. It’s the importance of economic analysis, because nobody can do everything.

So being able to say that I can’t boil the ocean, because you are going to boil everything else in it, but I can do these things. If I could do these things, it’s very clear what I am trying to do. It’s very clear what the benefit is. We’ve analyzed it, and it’s probably something everybody can do. Then, we can get to better.

Better is better than omnibus. Omnibus is something everybody gets thrown under if you make something too big. Sorry, I had to say that.

So Problem Statement: why is this important? You would think it’s obvious, Mary Ann, except that it isn’t, because so often the discussions I have with people, tell me what problem you are worried about? What are you trying to accomplish? If you don’t tell me that, then we’re going to be all over the map. You say potato and I say “potahto,” and the chorus of that song is, “let’s call the whole thing off.”

I use supply chain as an example, because this one is all over the map. Bad quality? Well, buying a crappy product is a risk of doing business. It’s not, per se, a supply chain risk. I’m not saying it’s not important, but it it’s certainly not a cyber-specific supply chain risk.

Bad security: well, that’s important, but again, that’s a business risk.

Backdoor bogeyman: this is the popular one. How do I know you didn’t put a backdoor in there? Well, you can’t actually, and that’s not a solvable problem.

Assurance, supply chain shutdown: yeah, I would like to know that a critical parts supplier isn’t going to go out of business. So these are all important, but they are all different problems.

So if you don’t say what you’re worried about, and it can’t be all the above. Almost every business has some supplier of some sort, even if it’s just healthcare. If you’re not careful how you define this, you will be trying to define a 100 percent of any entity’s business operations. And that’s not appropriate.

Use cases are really important, because you may have a Problem Statement. I’ll give you one, and this is not to ding NIST in any way, shape, or form, but I just read this. It’s the Cryptographic Key Management System draft. The only reason I cite this as an example is that I couldn’t actually find a use case in there.

So whatever the merits of that are saying, are you trying to develop a super secret key management system for government, very sensitive cryptographic things you are building from scratch, or you are trying to define a key management system that we have to use for things like TLS or any encryption that any commercial product does, because that’s way out of scope?

So without that, what are you worried about? And also what’s going to happen is somebody is going to cite this in an RFP and it’s going to be, are you compliant with bladdy-blah? And you have no idea whether that even should apply.

Problem Statement

So that Problem Statement is really important, because without that, you can’t have that dialogue in groups like this. Well, what are we trying to accomplish? What are we worried about? What are the worst problems to solve?

Precise Language is also very important. Why? Because it turns out everybody speaks a slightly different language, even if we all speak some dialect of geek, and that is, for example, a vulnerability.

If you say vulnerability to my vulnerability handling team, they think of that as a security vulnerability that’s caused by a defect in software.

But I’ve seen it used to include, well, you didn’t configure the product properly. I don’t know what that is, but it’s not a vulnerability, at least not to a vendor. You implemented a policy incorrectly. It might lead to vulnerability, but it isn’t one. So you are seeing where I am going with this. If you don’t have language to find very crisply the same thing, you read something and you go off and do it and you realize you solved the wrong problem.

I am very fortunate. One of my colleagues from Oracle, who works on our hardware, and I also saw a presentation by people in that group at the Cryptographic Conference in November. They talked about how much trouble we got into because if you say, “module” to a hardware person, it’s a very different thing from what it meant to somebody trying to certify it. This is a huge problem because again you say, potato, I say “potahto.” It’s not the same thing to everybody. So it needs to be very precisely defined.

Scope is also important. I don’t know why. I have to say this a lot and it does get kind of tiresome, I am sure to the recipients, COTS isn’t GOTS. Commercial software is not government software, and it’s actually globally developed. That’s the only way you get commercial software, the feature rich, reads frequently. We have access to global talent.

It’s not designed for all threat environments. It can certainly be better, and I think most people are moving towards better software, most likely because we’re getting beaten up by hackers and then our customers, and it’s good business. But there is no commercial market for high-assurance software or hardware, and that’s really important, because there is only so much that you can do to move the market.

So even a standards developer or big U.S. governments, is an important customer in the market for a lot of people, but they’re not big enough to move the marketplace on their own, and so you are limited by the business dynamic.

So that’s important, you can get to better. I tell people, “Okay, anybody here have a Volkswagen? Okay, is it an MRAP vehicle? No, it’s not, is it? You bought a Volkswagen and you got a Volkswagen. You can’t take a Volkswagen and drive it around streets and expect it to perform like an MRAP vehicle. Even a system integrator, a good one, cannot sprinkle pixie dust over that Volkswagen and turn it into an MRAP vehicle. Those are very different threat environments.

Why you think commercial software and hardware is different? It’s not different. It’s exactly the same thing. You might have a really good Volkswagen, and it’s great for commuting, but it is never going to perform in an IED environment. It wasn’t designed for that, and there is nothing you can do or make it designed to perform in that environment.

Pragmatism

Pragmatism; I really wish anybody working on any standard would do some economic analysis, because economics rules the world. Even if it’s something really good, a really good idea, time, money, and people, particularly qualified security people, are constrained resourses.

So if you make people do something that looks good on paper, but it’s really time-consuming, it’s an opportunity, the cost is too high. That means what is the value of something you could do with those resources that would either cost less or deliver higher benefit. And if you don’t do that analysis, then you have people say, “Hey, that’s a great idea. Wow, that’s great too. I’d like that.” It’s like asking your kid, “Do you want candy. Do want new toys? Do want more footballs?” Instead of saying, “Hey, you have 50 bucks, what you are going to do with it?”

And then there are unintended consequences, because if you make this too complex, you just have fewer suppliers. People will never say, “I’m just not going to bid because it’s impossible.” I’m going to give you three examples and again I’m trying to be respectful here. This is not to dis anybody who worked on these. In some cases, these things have been subsequent revisions that have been modified, which I really appreciate. But there are examples of, when you think about it, what were you asking for in the first place.

I think this was an early version of NISTR 7622 and has since been excised. There was a requirement that the purchaser wanted to be notified of personnel changes involving maintenance. Okay, what does that mean?

I know what I think they wanted, which is, if you are outsourcing the human resources for the Defense Department and you move the whole thing to “Hackistan,” obviously they would want to be notified. I got that, but that’s not what it said.

So I look at that and say, we have 5,000 products, at least, at Oracle. We have billions and billions of lines of code everyday. Somebody checks out a transaction, getting some code, and they do some work on it and they didn’t write it in the first place.

So am I going to tweet all that to somebody. What’s that going to do for you? Plus you have things like the German Workers Council. We are going to tell the US Government that Jurgen worked on this line of code. Oh no, that’s not going to happen.

So what was it you were worried about, because that is not sustainable, tweeting people 10,000 times a day with code changes is just going to consume a lot of resource.

In another one, had this in an early version of something they were trying to do. They wanted to know, for each phase of development for each project, how many foreigners worked on it? What’s a foreigner? Is it a Green Card holder? Is it someone who has a dual passport? What is that going to do for you?

Now again if you had a super custom code for some intelligence, I can understand there might be cases in which that would matter. But general-purpose software is not one of them. As I said, I can give you that information. We’re a big company and we’ve got lots of resource. A smaller company probably can’t. Again, what will I do for you, because I am taking resources I could be using on something much more valuable and putting them on something really silly.

Last, but not least, and again, with respect, I think I know why this was in there. It might have been the secure engineering draft standard that you came up with that has many good parts to it.

Root Cause Analysis

I think vendors will probably understand this pretty quickly. Root Cause Analysis. If you have a vulnerability, one of the first things you should use is Root Cause Analysis. If you’re a vendor and you have a CVSS 10 Security vulnerability in a product that’s being exploited, what do you think the first thing you are going to do is?

Get a patch in your customers’ hands or work around? Yeah, probably, that’s probably the number one priority. Also, Root Cause Analysis, particularly for really nasty security bugs, is really important. CVSS 0, who cares? But for 9 or 10, you should be doing that common analysis.

I’ve got a better one. We have a technology we have called Java. Maybe you’ve heard of it. We put a lot of work into fixing Java. One of the things we did is not only Root Cause Analysis, for CVSS 9 and higher. They have to go in front of my boss. Every Java developer had to sit through that briefing. How did this happen?

Last but not least, looking for other similar instances, not just root cause, how did that get in there and how do we avoid it. Where else does this problem exist. I am not saying this to make us look good; I ‘m saying for the analytics. What are you really trying to solve here. Root Cause Analysis is important, but it’s important in context. If I have to do it for everything, it’s probably not the best use of a scarce resource.

My last point is to minimize prescriptiveness within limits. For example, probably some people in here don’t know how to bake or maybe you made a pie. There is no one right way to bake a cherry pie. Some people go down to Ralphs and they get a frozen Marie Callendar’s out of the freezer, they stick it in the oven, and they’ve got a pretty good cherry pie.

Some people make everything from scratch. Some people use a prepared pie crust and they do something special with the cherries they picked off their tree, but there is no one way to do that that is going to work for everybody.

Best practice for something. For example, I can say truthfully that a best development practice would not be just start coding, number one; and number two, it compiles without too many errors on the base platform, and ship it. That is not good development practice.

If you mandate too much, it will stifle innovation and it won’t work for people. Plus, as I mentioned, you will have an opportunity cost. If I’m doing something that somebody says I have to do, but there is a more innovative way of doing that.

We don’t have a single development methodology in Oracle, mostly because of acquisitions. We buy a great company, we don’t tell them, “You know, that agile thing you are doing, it’s the last year. You have to do waterfall.” That’s not going to work very well, but there are good practices even within those different methodologies.

Allowing for different hows is really important. Static analysis is one of them. I think static analysis is kind of industry practice now, and people should be doing it. Third party is really bad. I have been opining about this, this morning.

Third-party Analysis

Let just say, I have a large customer, I won’t name who used a third-party static analysis service. They broke their license agreement with us. They’re getting a lot of it from us. Worse, they give us a report that included vulnerabilities from one of our competitors. I don’t want to know about those, right? I can’t fix some. I did tell my competitor, “You should know this report exist, because I’m sure you want to analyze this.”

Here’s the worst part. How many of those vulnerabilities the third-party found you think had any merit? Run tool is nothing; analyzing results is everything. That customer and the vendor wasted the time of one of our best security leads, trying to make sure there was no there there, and there wasn’t.

So again, and last but not least, government can use their purchasing power in lot of very good ways, but realize that regulatory things are probably going to lag actual practice. You could be specifying buggy whip standards and the reality is that nobody uses buggy whips anymore. It’s not always about the standard, particularly if you are using resources in a less than optimal way.

One of the things I like about The Open Group is that here we have actual practitioners. This is one of the best forums I have seen, because there are people who have actual subject matter expertise to bring to the table, which is so important in saying what is going to work and can be effective.

The last thing I am going to say is a nice thank you to the people in The Open Group Trusted Technology Forum (OTTF), because I appreciate the caliber of my colleagues, and also Sally Long. They talk about this type of an effort as herding cats, and at least for me, it’s probably like herding a snarly cat. I can be very snarly. I’m sure you can pick up on that.

So I truly appreciate the professionalism and the focus and the targeting. Targeting a good slice of making a supply-chain problem better, not boiling the ocean, but very focused and targeted and with very high-caliber participation. So thank you to my colleagues and particularly thank you to Sally, and that’s it, I will turn it over to others.

By The Open GroupJim Hietala: We do, we have a few questions from the audience. So the first one and both here could feel free to chime in on this. Something you brought up Dr. Ross, building security in looking at software and systems engineering processes. How do you bring industry along in terms of commercial off-the-shelf products and services especially when you look at things like IoT, where we have got IP interfaces grafted on to all sorts of devices?

Ross: As Mary Ann was saying before, the strength of any standard is really its implementability out there. When we talk about, in particular, the engineering standard, the 15288 extension, if we do that correctly every organization out there who’s already using — let’s say a security development lifecycle like the 27034, you can pick your favorite standard — we should be able to reflect those activities in the different lanes of the 15288 processes.

This is a very important point that I got from Mary Ann’s discussion. We have to win the hearts and minds and be able to reflect things in a disciplined and structured process that doesn’t take people off their current game. If they’re doing good work, we should be able to reflect that good work and say, “I’m doing these activities whether it’s SDL, and this is how it would map to those activities that we are trying to find in the 15288.”

And that can apply to the IoT. Again, it goes back to the computer, whether it’s Oracle database or a Microsoft operating system. It’s all about the code and the discipline and structure of building that software and integrating it into a system. This is where we can really bring together industry, academia, and government and actually do something that we all agree on.

Different Take

Davidson: I would have a slightly different take on this. I know this is not a voice crying in the wilderness. My concern about the IoT goes back to things I learned in business school in financial market theory, which unfortunately has been borne out in 2008.

There are certain types of risks you can mitigate. If I cross a busy street, I’m worried about getting hit by a car. I can look both ways. I can mitigate that. You can’t mitigate systemic risk. It means that you created a fragile system. That is the problem with the IoT, and that is a problem that no jury of engineering will solve.

If it’s not a problem, why aren’t we giving nuclear weapons’ IP addresses? Okay, I am not making this up. The Air Force thought about that at one point. You’re laughing. Okay, Armageddon, there is an app for that.

That’s the problem. I know this is going to happen anyway. whether or not I approve of it, but I really wish that people could look at this, not just in terms of how many of these devices and what a great opportunity, but what is a systemic risk that we are creating by doing this.

My house is not connected to the Internet directly and I do not want somebody to shut my appliances off or shut down my refrigerator or lock it so that I can’t get into it or use that for launching an attack, those are the discussions we should be having — at least as much as how we make sure that people designing these things have a clue.

Hietala: The next question is, how do customers and practitioners value the cost of security, and then a kind of related question on what can global companies due to get C-Suite attention and investment on cybersecurity, that whole ROI value discussion?

Davidson: I know they value it because nobody calls me up and says, “I am bored this week. Don’t you have more security patches for me to apply?” That’s actually true. We know what it costs us to produce a lot of these patches, and it’s important for the amount of resources we spend on that I would much rather be putting them on building something new and innovative, where we could charge money for it and provide more value to customers.

So it’s cost avoidance, number one; number two more people have an IT backbone. They understand the value of having it be reliable. Probably one of the reasons people are moving to clouds is that it’s hard to maintain all these and hard to find the right people to maintain them. But also I do have more customers asking us now about our security practices, which is be careful what you wish for

I said this 10 years ago. People should be demanding. They know what we’re doing and now I am going to spend a lot of time answering RFPs, but that’s good. These people are aware of this. They’re running their business on our stuff and they want to know what kind of care we’re taking to make sure we’re protecting their data and their mission-critical applications as if it were ours.

Difficult Question

Ross: The ROI question is very difficult with regard to security. I think this goes back to what I said earlier. The sooner we get security out of its stovepipe and integrated as just part of the best practices that we do everyday, whether it’s in the development work at a company or whether it’s in our enterprises as part of our mainstream organizational management things like the SDLC, or if we are doing any engineering work within the organization, or if we have the Enterprise Architecture group involved. That integration makes security less of  “hey, I am special” and more of just a part of the way we do business.

So customers are looking for reliability and dependability. They rely on this great bed of IT product systems and services and they’re not always focused on the security aspects. They just want to make sure it works and that if there is an attack and the malware goes creeping through their system, they can be as protected as they need to be, and sometimes that flies way below their radar.

So it’s got to be a systemic process and an organizational transformation. I think we have to go through it, and we are not quite there just yet.

Davidson: Yeah, and you really do have to bake it in. I have a team of — I’ve got three more headcount, hoo-hoo — 45 people, but we have about 1,600 people in development whose jobs are to be security points of contact and security leads. They’re the boots on the ground who implement our program, because I don’t want to have an organization that peers over everybody’s shoulder to make sure they are writing good code. It’s not cost-effective, not a good way to do it. It’s cultural.

One of the ways that you do that is seeding those people in the organization, so they become the boots on the ground and they have authority to do things, because you’re not going to succeed otherwise.

Going back to Java, that was the first discussion I had with one of the executives that this is a cultural thing. Everybody needs to feel that he or she is personally responsible for security, not those 10-20 whatever those people are, whoever the security weenie is. It’s got to be everybody and when you can do that, you really have to see change and how things happen. Everybody is not going to be a security expert, but everybody has some responsibility for security.

Transcript available here.

Transcript of part of the proceedings from The Open Group San Diego 2015 in February. Copyright The Open Group and Interarbor Solutions, LLC, 2005-2015. All rights reserved.

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Business Benefit from Public Data

By Dr. Chris Harding, Director for Interoperability, The Open Group

Public bodies worldwide are making a wealth of information available, and encouraging its commercial exploitation. This sounds like a bonanza for the private sector at the public expense, but entrepreneurs are holding back. A healthy market for products and services that use public-sector information would provide real benefits for everyone. What can we do to bring it about?

Why Governments Give Away Data

The EU directive of 2003 on the reuse of public sector information encourages the Member States to make as much information available for reuse as possible. This directive was revised and strengthened in 2013. The U.S. Open Government Directive of 2009 provides similar encouragement, requiring US government agencies to post at least three high-value data sets online and register them on its data.gov portal. Other countries have taken similar measures to make public data publicly available.

Why are governments doing this? There are two main reasons.

One is that it improves the societies that they serve and the governments themselves. Free availability of information about society and government makes people more effective citizens and makes government more efficient. It illuminates discussion of civic issues, and points a searchlight at corruption.

The second reason is that it has a positive effect on the wealth of nations and their citizens. The EU directive highlights the ability of European companies to exploit the potential of public-sector information, and contribute to economic growth and job creation. Information is not just the currency of democracy. It is also the lubricant of a successful economy.

Success Stories

There are some big success stories.

If you drive a car, you probably use satellite navigation to find your way about, and this may use public-sector information. In the UK, for example, map data that can be used by sat-nav systems is supplied for commercial use by a government agency, the Ordnance Survey.

When you order something over the web for delivery to your house, you often enter a postal code and see most of the address auto-completed by the website. Postcode databases are maintained by national postal authorities, which are generally either government departments or regulated private corporations, and made available by them for commercial use. Here, the information is not directly supporting a market, but is contributing to the sale of a range of unrelated products and services.

The data may not be free. There are commercial arrangements for supply of map and postcode data. But it is available, and is the basis for profitable products and for features that make products more competitive.

The Bonanza that Isn’t

These successes are, so far, few in number. The economic benefits of open government data could be huge. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates a potential of between 3 and 5 trillion dollars annually. Yet the direct impact of Open Data on the EU economy in 2010, seven years after the directive was issued, is estimated by Capgemini at only about 1% of that, although the EU accounts for nearly a quarter of world GDP.

The business benefits to be gained from using map and postcode data are obvious. There are other kinds of public sector data, where the business benefits may be substantial, but they are not easy to see. For example, data is or could be available about public transport schedules and availability, about population densities, characteristics and trends, and about real estate and land use. These are all areas that support substantial business activity, but businesses in these areas seldom make use of public sector information today.

Where are the Products?

Why are entrepreneurs not creating these potentially profitable products and services? There is one obvious reason. The data they are interested in is not always available and, where it is available, it is provided in different ways, and comes in different formats. Instead of a single large market, the entrepreneur sees a number of small markets, none of which is worth tackling. For example, the market for an application that plans public transport journeys across a single town is not big enough to justify substantial investment in product development. An application that could plan journeys across any town in Europe would certainly be worthwhile, but is not possible unless all the towns make this data available in a common format.

Public sector information providers often do not know what value their data has, or understand its applications. Working within tight budgets, they cannot afford to spend large amounts of effort on assembling and publishing data that will not be used. They follow the directives but, without common guidelines, they simply publish whatever is readily to hand, in whatever form it happens to be.

The data that could support viable products is not available everywhere and, where it is available, it comes in different formats. (One that is often used is PDF, which is particularly difficult to process as an information source.) The result is that the cost of product development is high, and the expected return is low.

Where is the Market?

There is a second reason why entrepreneurs hesitate. The shape of the market is unclear. In a mature market, everyone knows who the key players are, understands their motivations, and can predict to some extent how they will behave. The market for products and services based on public sector information is still taking shape. No one is even sure what kinds of organization will take part, or what they will do. How far, for example, will public-sector bodies go in providing free applications? Can large corporations buy future dominance with loss-leader products? Will some unknown company become an overnight success, like Facebook? With these unknowns, the risks are very high.

Finding the Answers

Public sector information providers and standards bodies are tackling these problems. The Open Group participates in SHARE-PSI, the European network for the exchange of experience and ideas around implementing open data policies in the public sector. The experience gained by SHARE-PSI will be used by the World-Wide Web Consortium as a basis for standards and guidelines for publication of public sector information. These standards and guidelines may be used, not just by the public sector, but by not-for-profit bodies and even commercial corporations, many of which have information that they want to make freely available.

The Open Group is making a key contribution by helping to map the shape of the market. It is using the Business Scenario technique from its well-known Enterprise Architecture methodology TOGAF® to identify the kinds of organization that will take part, and their objectives and concerns.

There will be a preview of this on October 22 at The Open Group event in London which will feature a workshop session on Open Public Sector Data. This workshop will look at how Open Data can help business, present a draft of the Business Scenario, and take input from participants to help develop its conclusions.

The developed Business Scenario will be presented at the SHARE-PSI workshop in Lisbon on December 3-4. The theme of this workshop is encouraging open data usage by commercial developers. It will bring a wide variety of stakeholders together to discuss and build the relationship between the public and private sectors. It will also address, through collaboration with the EU LAPSI project, the legal framework for use of open public sector data.

Benefit from Participation!

If you are thinking about publishing or using public-sector data, you can benefit from these workshops by gaining an insight into the way that the market is developing. In the long term, you can influence the common standards and guidelines that are being developed. In the short term, you can find out what is happening and network with others who are interested.

The social and commercial benefits of open public-sector data are not being realized today. They can be realized through a healthy market in products and services that process the data and make it useful to citizens. That market will emerge when public bodies and businesses clearly understand the roles that they can play. Now is the time to develop that understanding and begin to profit from it.

Register for The Open Group London 2014 event at http://www.opengroup.org/london2014/registration.

Find out how to participate in the Lisbon SHARE-PSI workshop at http://www.w3.org/2013/share-psi/workshop/lisbon/#Participation

 

Chris HardingDr. Chris Harding is Director for Interoperability at The Open Group. He has been with The Open Group for more than ten years, and is currently responsible for managing and supporting its work on interoperability, including SOA and interoperability aspects of Cloud Computing, and the Open Platform 3.0™ Forum. He is a member of the BCS, the IEEE and the AEA, and is a certified TOGAF® practitioner.

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Open FAIR Blog Series – An Introduction to Risk Analysis and the Open FAIR Body of Knowledge

By Jim Hietala, VP, Security and Andrew Josey, Director of Standards, The Open Group

This is the first in a four-part series of blogs introducing the Open FAIR Body of Knowledge. In this first blog. we look at what the Open FAIR Body of Knowledge provides, and why a taxonomy is needed for Risk Analysis.

An Introduction to Risk Analysis and the Open FAIR Body of Knowledge

The Open FAIR Body of Knowledge provides a taxonomy and method for understanding, analyzing and measuring information risk. It allows organizations to:

  • Speak in one language concerning their risk using the standard taxonomy and terminology, and communicate risk effectively to senior management
  • Consistently study and apply risk analysis principles to any object or asset
  • View organizational risk in total
  • Challenge and defend risk decisions
  • Compare risk mitigation options

What does FAIR stand for?

FAIR is an acronym for Factor Analysis of Information Risk.

Risk Analysis: The Need for an Accurate Model and Taxonomy

Organizations seeking to analyze and manage risk encounter some common challenges. Put simply, it is difficult to make sense of risk without having a common understanding of both the factors that (taken together) contribute to risk, and the relationships between those factors. The Open FAIR Body of Knowledge provides such a taxonomy.

Here’s an example that will help to illustrate why a standard taxonomy is important. Let’s assume that you are an information security risk analyst tasked with determining how much risk your company is exposed to from a “lost or stolen laptop” scenario. The degree of risk that the organization experiences in such a scenario will vary widely depending on a number of key factors. To even start to approach an analysis of the risk posed by this scenario to your organization, you will need to answer a number of questions, such as:

  • Whose laptop is this?
  • What data resides on this laptop?
  • How and where did the laptop get lost or stolen?
  • What security measures were in place to protect the data on the laptop?
  • How strong were the security controls?

The level of risk to your organization will vary widely based upon the answers to these questions. The degree of overall organizational risk posed by lost laptops must also include an estimation of the frequency of occurrence of lost or stolen laptops across the organization.

In one extreme, suppose the laptop belonged to your CTO, who had IP stored on it in the form of engineering plans for a revolutionary product in a significant new market. If the laptop was unprotected in terms of security controls, and it was stolen while he was on a business trip to a country known for state-sponsored hacking and IP theft, then there is likely to be significant risk to your organization. On the other extreme, suppose the laptop belonged to a junior salesperson a few days into their job, it contained no customer or prospect lists, and it was lost at a security checkpoint at an airport. In this scenario, there’s likely to be much less risk. Or consider a laptop which is used by the head of sales for the organization, who has downloaded Personally Identifiable Information (PII) on customers from the CRM system in order to do sales analysis, and has his or her laptop stolen. In this case, there could be Primary Loss to the organization, and there might also be Secondary Losses associated with reactions by the individuals whose data is compromised.

The Open FAIR Body of Knowledge is designed to help you to ask the right questions to determine the asset at risk (is it the laptop itself, or the data?), the magnitude of loss, the skill level and motivations of the attacker, the resistance strength of any security controls in place, the frequency of occurrence of the threat and of an actual loss event, and other factors that contribute to the overall level of risk for any specific risk scenario.

In our next blog in this series, we will consider 5 reasons why you should use The Open FAIR Body of Knowledge for Risk Analysis.

The Open FAIR Body of Knowledge consists of the following Open Group standards:

  • Risk Taxonomy (O-RT), Version 2.0 (C13K, October 2013) defines a taxonomy for the factors that drive information security risk – Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR).
  • Risk Analysis (O-RA) (C13G, October 2013) describes process aspects associated with performing effective risk analysis.

These can be downloaded from The Open Group publications catalog at http://www.opengroup.org/bookstore/catalog.

Our other publications include a Pocket Guide and a Certification Study Guide.

62940-hietalaJim Hietala, CISSP, GSEC, is the Vice President, Security for The Open Group, where he manages all IT Security, Risk Management and Healthcare programs and standards activities. He participates in the SANS Analyst/Expert program and has also published numerous articles on Information Security, Risk Management, and compliance topics in publications including The ISSA Journal, Bank Accounting & Finance, Risk Factor, SC Magazine, and others.

 

andrew-small1Andrew Josey is Director of Standards within The Open Group. He is currently managing the standards process for The Open Group, and has recently led the standards development projects for TOGAF® 9.1, ArchiMate® 2.0, IEEE Std 1003.1-2008 (POSIX), and the core specifications of the Single UNIX® Specification, Version 4. Previously, he has led the development and operation of many of The Open Group certification development projects, including industry-wide certification programs for the UNIX system, the Linux Standard Base, TOGAF, and IEEE POSIX. He is a member of the IEEE, USENIX, UKUUG, and the Association of Enterprise Architects.

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New Health Data Deluges Require Secure Information Flow Enablement Via Standards, Says The Open Group’s New Healthcare Director

By The Open Group

Below is the transcript of The Open Group podcast on how new devices and practices have the potential to expand the information available to Healthcare providers and facilities.

Listen to the podcast here.

Dana Gardner: Hello, and welcome to a special BriefingsDirect Thought Leadership Interview coming to you in conjunction with The Open Group’s upcoming event, Enabling Boundaryless Information Flow™ July 21-22, 2014 in Boston.

GardnerI’m Dana Gardner, Principal Analyst at Interarbor Solutions and I’ll be your host and moderator for the series of discussions from the conference on Boundaryless Information Flow, Open Platform 3.0™, Healthcare, and Security issues.

One area of special interest is the Healthcare arena, and Boston is a hotbed of innovation and adaption for how technology, Enterprise Architecture, and standards can improve the communication and collaboration among Healthcare ecosystem players.

And so, we’re joined by a new Forum Director at The Open Group to learn how an expected continued deluge of data and information about patients, providers, outcomes, and efficiencies is pushing the Healthcare industry to rapid change.

WJason Lee headshotith that, please join me now in welcoming our guest. We’re here with Jason Lee, Healthcare and Security Forums Director at The Open Group. Welcome, Jason.

Jason Lee: Thank you so much, Dana. Good to be here.

Gardner: Great to have you. I’m looking forward to the Boston conference and want to remind our listeners and readers that it’s not too late to sign up. You can learn more at http://www.opengroup.org.

Jason, let’s start by talking about the relationship between Boundaryless Information Flow, which is a major theme of the conference, and healthcare. Healthcare perhaps is the killer application for Boundaryless Information Flow.

Lee: Interesting, I haven’t heard it referred to that way, but healthcare is 17 percent of the US economy. It’s upwards of $3 trillion. The costs of healthcare are a problem, not just in the United States, but all over the world, and there are a great number of inefficiencies in the way we practice healthcare.

We don’t necessarily intend to be inefficient, but there are so many places and people involved in healthcare, it’s very difficult to get them to speak the same language. It’s almost as if you’re in a large house with lots of different rooms, and every room you walk into they speak a different language. To get information to flow from one room to the other requires some active efforts and that’s what we’re undertaking here at The Open Group.

Gardner: What is it about the current collaboration approaches that don’t work? Obviously, healthcare has been around for a long time and there have been different players involved. What’s the hurdle? What prevents a nice, seamless, easy flow and collaboration in information that gets better outcomes? What’s the holdup?

Lee: There are many ways to answer that question, because there are many barriers. Perhaps the simplest is the transformation of healthcare from a paper-based industry to a digital industry. Everyone has walked into an office, looked behind the people at the front desk, and seen file upon file and row upon row of folders, information that’s kept in a written format.

When there’s been movement toward digitizing that information, not everyone has used the same system. It’s almost like trains running on a different gauge track. Obviously if the track going east to west is a different gauge than going north to south, then trains aren’t going to be able to travel on those same tracks. In the same way, healthcare information does not flow easily from one office to another or from one provider to another.

Gardner: So not only do we have disparate strategies for collecting and communicating health data, but we’re also seeing much larger amounts of data coming from a variety of new and different places. Some of them now even involve sensors inside of patients themselves or devices that people will wear. So is the data deluge, the volume, also an issue here?

Lee: Certainly. I heard recently that an integrated health plan, which has multiple hospitals involved, contains more elements of data than the Library of Congress. As information is collected at multiple points in time, over a relatively short period of time, you really do have a data deluge. Figuring out how to find your way through all the data and look at the most relevant for the patient is a great challenge.

Gardner: I suppose the bad news is that there is this deluge of data, but it’s also good news, because more data means more opportunity for analysis, a better ability to predict and determine best practices, and also provide overall lower costs with better patient care.

So it seems like the stakes are rather high here to get this right, to not just crumble under a volume or an avalanche of data, but to master it, because it’s perhaps the future. The solution is somewhere in there too.

Lee: No question about it. At The Open Group, our focus is on solutions. We, like others, put a great deal of effort into describing the problems, but figuring out how to bring IT technologies to bear on business problems, how to encourage different parts of organizations to speak to one another and across organizations to speak the same language, and to operate using common standards and language. That’s really what we’re all about.

And it is, in a large sense, part of the process of helping to bring healthcare into the 21st Century. A number of industries are a couple of decades ahead of healthcare in the way they use large datasets — big data, some people refer to it as. I’m talking about companies like big department stores and large online retailers. They really have stepped up to the plate and are using that deluge of data in ways that are very beneficial to them, and healthcare can do the same. We’re just not quite at the same level of evolution.

Gardner: And to your point, the stakes are so much higher. Retail is, of course, a big deal in the economy, but as you pointed out, healthcare is such a much larger segment and portion. So just making modest improvements in communication, collaboration, or data analysis can reap huge rewards.

Lee: Absolutely true. There is the cost side of things, but there is also the quality side. So there are many ways in which healthcare can improve through standardization and coordinated development, using modern technology that cannot just reduce cost, but improve quality at the same time.

Gardner: I’d like to get into a few of the hotter trends, but before we do, it seems that The Open Group has recognized the importance here by devoting the entire second day of their conference in Boston, that will be on July 22, to Healthcare.

Maybe you could give us a brief overview of what participants, and even those who come in online and view recorded sessions of the conference at http://new.livestream.com/opengroup should expect? What’s going to go on July 22nd?

Lee: We have a packed day. We’re very excited to have Dr. Joe Kvedar, a physician at Partners HealthCare and Founding Director of the Center for Connected Health, as our first plenary speaker. The title of his presentation is “Making Health Additive.” Dr. Kvedar is a widely respected expert on mobile health, which is currently the Healthcare Forum’s top work priority. As mobile medical devices become ever more available and diversified, they will enable consumers to know more about their own health and wellness. A great deal of data of potentially useful health data will be generated. How this information can be used–not just by consumers but also by the healthcare establishment that takes care of them as patients, will become a question of increasing importance. It will become an area where standards development and The Open Group can be very helpful.

Our second plenary speaker, Proteus Duxbury, Chief Technology Officer at Connect for Health Colorado,will discuss a major feature of the Affordable Care Act—the health insurance exchanges–which are designed to bring health insurance to tens of millions of people who previously did not have access to it. Mr. Duxbury is going to talk about how Enterprise Architecture–which is really about getting to solutions by helping the IT folks talk to the business folks and vice versa–has helped the State of Colorado develop their Health Insurance Exchange.

After the plenaries, we will break up into 3 tracks, one of which is Healthcare-focused. In this track there will be three presentations, all of which discuss how Enterprise Architecture and the approach to Boundaryless Information Flow can help healthcare and healthcare decision-makers become more effective and efficient.

One presentation will focus on the transformation of care delivery at the Visiting Nurse Service of New York. Another will address stewarding healthcare transformation using Enterprise Architecture, focusing on one of our Platinum members, Oracle, and a company called Intelligent Medical Objects, and how they’re working together in a productive way, bringing IT and healthcare decision-making together.

Then, the final presentation in this track will focus on the development of an Enterprise Architecture-based solution at an insurance company. The payers, or the insurers–the big companies that are responsible for paying bills and collecting premiums–have a very important role in the healthcare system that extends beyond administration of benefits. Yet, payers are not always recognized for their key responsibilities and capabilities in the area of clinical improvements and cost improvements.

With the increase in payer data brought on in large part by the adoption of a new coding system–the ICD-10–which will come online this year, there will be a huge amount of additional data, including clinical data, that become available. At The Open Group, we consider payers—health insurance companies (some of which are integrated with providers)–as very important stakeholders in the big picture..

In the afternoon, we’re going to switch gears a bit and have a speaker talk about the challenges, the barriers, the “pain points” in introducing new technology into the healthcare systems. The focus will return to remote or mobile medical devices and the predictable but challenging barriers to getting newly generated health information to flow to doctors’ offices and into patients records, electronic health records, and hospitals data keeping and data sharing systems.

We’ll have a panel of experts that responds to these pain points, these challenges, and then we’ll draw heavily from the audience, who we believe will be very, very helpful, because they bring a great deal of expertise in guiding us in our work. So we’re very much looking forward to the afternoon as well.

Gardner: It’s really interesting. A couple of these different plenaries and discussions in the afternoon come back to this user-generated data. Jason, we really seem to be on the cusp of a whole new level of information that people will be able to develop from themselves through their lifestyle, new devices that are connected.

We hear from folks like Apple, Samsung, Google, and Microsoft. They’re all pulling together information and making it easier for people to not only monitor their exercise, but their diet, and maybe even start to use sensors to keep track of blood sugar levels, for example.

In fact, a new Flurry Analytics survey showed 62 percent increase in the use of health and fitness application over the last six months on the popular mobile devices. This compares to a 33 percent increase in other applications in general. So there’s an 87 percent faster uptick in the use of health and fitness applications.

Tell me a little bit how you see this factoring in. Is this a mixed blessing? Will so much data generated from people in addition to the electronic medical records, for example, be a bad thing? Is this going to be a garbage in, garbage out, or is this something that could potentially be a game-changer in terms of how people react to their own data and then bring more data into the interactions they have with care providers?

Lee: It’s always a challenge to predict what the market is going to do, but I think that’s a remarkable statistic that you cited. My prediction is that the increased volume of person- generated data from mobile health devices is going to be a game-changer. This view also reflects how the Healthcare Forum members (which includes members from Capgemini, Philips, IBM, Oracle and HP) view the future.

The commercial demand for mobile medical devices, things that can be worn, embedded, or swallowed, as in pills, as you mentioned, is growing ever more. The software and the applications that will be developed to be used with the devices is going to grow by leaps and bounds. As you say, there are big players getting involved. Already some of the pedometer type devices that measure the number of steps taken in a day have captured the interest of many, many people. Even David Sedaris, serious guy that he is, was writing about it recently in ‘The New Yorker’.

What we will find is that many of the health indicators that we used to have to go to the doctor or nurse or lab to get information on will become available to us through these remote devices.

There will be a question, of course, as to reliability and validity of the information, to your point about garbage in, garbage out, but I think standards development will help here This, again, is where The Open Group comes in. We might also see the FDA exercising its role in ensuring safety here, as well as other organizations, in determining which devices are reliable.

The Open Group is working in the area of mobile data and information systems that are developed around them, and their ability to (a) talk to one another and (b) talk to the data devices/infrastructure used in doctors’ offices and in hospitals. This is called interoperability and it’s certainly lacking in the country.

There are already problems around interoperability and connectivity of information in the healthcare establishment as it is now. When patients and consumers start collecting their own data, and the patient is put at the center of the nexus of healthcare, then the question becomes how does that information that patients collect get back to the doctor/clinician in ways in which the data can be trusted and where the data are helpful?

After all, if a patient is wearing a medical device, there is the opportunity to collect data, about blood sugar level let’s say, throughout the day. And this is really taking healthcare outside of the four walls of the clinic and bringing information to bear that can be very, very useful to clinicians and beneficial to patients.

In short, the rapid market dynamic in mobile medical devices and in the software and hardware that facilitates interoperability begs for standards-based solutions that reduce costs and improve quality, and all of which puts the patient at the center. This is The Open Group’s Healthcare Forum’s sweet spot.

Gardner: It seems to me a real potential game-changer as well, and that something like Boundaryless Information Flow and standards will play an essential role. Because one of the big question marks with many of the ailments in a modern society has to do with lifestyle and behavior.

So often, the providers of the care only really have the patient’s responses to questions, but imagine having a trove of data at their disposal, a 360-degree view of the patient to then further the cause of understanding what’s really going on, on a day-to-day basis.

But then, it’s also having a two-way street, being able to deliver perhaps in an automated fashion reinforcements and incentives, information back to the patient in real-time about behavior and lifestyles. So it strikes me as something quite promising, and I look forward to hearing more about it at the Boston conference.

Any other thoughts on this issue about patient flow of data, not just among and between providers and payers, for example, or providers in an ecosystem of care, but with the patient as the center of it all, as you said?

Lee: As more mobile medical devices come to the market, we’ll find that consumers own multiple types of devices at least some of which collect multiple types of data. So even for the patient, being at the center of their own healthcare information collection, there can be barriers to having one device talk to the other. If a patient wants to keep their own personal health record, there may be difficulties in bringing all that information into one place.

So the interoperability issue, the need for standards, guidelines, and voluntary consensus among stakeholders about how information is represented becomes an issue, not just between patients and their providers, but for individual consumers as well.

Gardner: And also the cloud providers. There will be a variety of large organizations with cloud-modeled services, and they are going to need to be, in some fashion, brought together, so that a complete 360-degree view of the patient is available when needed. It’s going to be an interesting time.

Of course, we’ve also looked at many other industries and tried to have a cloud synergy, a cloud-of-clouds approach to data and also the transaction. So it’s interesting how what’s going on in multiple industries is common, but it strikes me that, again, the scale and the impact of the healthcare industry makes it a leader now, and perhaps a driver for some of these long overdue structured and standardized activities.

Lee: It could become a leader. There is no question about it. Moreover, there is a lot Healthcare can learn from other companies, from mistakes that other companies have made, from lessons they have learned, from best practices they have developed (both on the content and process side). And there are issues, around security in particular, where Healthcare will be at the leading edge in trying to figure out how much is enough, how much is too much, and what kinds of solutions work.

There’s a great future ahead here. It’s not going to be without bumps in the road, but organizations like The Open Group are designed and experienced to help multiple stakeholders come together and have the conversations that they need to have in order to push forward and solve some of these problems.

Gardner: Well, great. I’m sure there will be a lot more about how to actually implement some of those activities at the conference. Again, that’s going to be in Boston, beginning on July 21, 2014.

We’ll have to leave it there. We’re about out of time. We’ve been talking with a new Director at The Open Group to learn how an expected continued deluge of data and information about patients and providers, outcomes and efficiencies are all working together to push the Healthcare industry to rapid change. And, as we’ve heard, that might very well spill over into other industries as well.

So we’ve seen how innovation and adaptation around technology, Enterprise Architecture and standards can improve the communication and collaboration among Healthcare ecosystem players.

It’s not too late to register for The Open Group Boston 2014 (http://www.opengroup.org/boston2014) and join the conversation via Twitter #ogchat #ogBOS, where you will be able to learn more about Boundaryless Information Flow, Open Platform 3.0, Healthcare and other relevant topics.

So a big thank you to our guest. We’ve been joined by Jason Lee, Healthcare and Security Forums Director at The Open Group. Thanks so much, Jason.

Lee: Thank you very much.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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The Power of APIs – Join The Open Group Tweet Jam on Wednesday, July 9th

By Loren K. Baynes, Director, Global Marketing Communications, The Open Group

The face of technology is evolving at breakneck speed, driven by demand from consumers and businesses alike for more robust, intuitive and integrated service offerings. APIs (application programming interfaces) have made this possible by offering greater interoperability between otherwise disparate software and hardware systems. While there are clear benefits to their use, how do today’s security and value-conscious enterprises take advantage of this new interoperability without exposing them themselves?

On Wednesday, July 9th at 9:00 am PT/12:00 pm ET/5:00 pm GMT, please join us for a tweet jam that will explore how APIs are changing the face of business today, and how to prepare for their implementation in your enterprise.

APIs are at the heart of how today’s technology communicates with one another, and have been influential in enabling new levels of development for social, mobility and beyond. The business benefits of APIs are endless, as are the opportunities to explore how they can be effectively used and developed.

There is reason to maintain a certain level of caution, however, as recent security issues involving open APIs have impacted overall confidence and sustainability.

This tweet jam will look at the business benefits of APIs, as well as potential vulnerabilities and weak points that you should be wary of when integrating them into your Enterprise Architecture.

We welcome The Open Group members and interested participants from all backgrounds to join the discussion and interact with our panel of thought-leaders from The Open Group including Jason Lee, Healthcare and Security Forums Director; Jim Hietala, Vice President of Security; David Lounsbury, CTO; and Dr. Chris Harding, Director for Interoperability and Open Platform 3.0™ Forum Director. To access the discussion, please follow the hashtag #ogchat during the allotted discussion time.

Interested in joining The Open Group Security Forum? Register your interest, here.

What Is a Tweet Jam?

A tweet jam is a 45 minute “discussion” hosted on Twitter. The purpose of the tweet jam is to share knowledge and answer questions on relevant and thought-provoking issues. Each tweet jam is led by a moderator and a dedicated group of experts to keep the discussion flowing. The public (or anyone using Twitter interested in the topic) is encouraged to join the discussion.

Participation Guidance

Here are some helpful guidelines for taking part in the tweet jam:

  • Please introduce yourself (name, title and organization)
  • Use the hashtag #ogchat following each of your tweets
  • Begin your tweets with the question number to which you are responding
  • Please refrain from individual product/service promotions – the goal of the tweet jam is to foster an open and informative dialogue
  • Keep your commentary focused, thoughtful and on-topic

If you have any questions prior to the event or would like to join as a participant, please contact George Morin (@GMorin81 or george.morin@hotwirepr.com).

We look forward to a spirited discussion and hope you will be able to join!

 

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3 Steps to Proactively Address Board-Level Security Concerns

By E.G. Nadhan, HP

Last month, I shared the discussions that ensued in a Tweet Jam conducted by The Open Group on Big Data and Security where the key takeaway was: Protecting Data is Good.  Protecting Information generated from Big Data is priceless.  Security concerns around Big Data continue to the extent that it has become a Board-level concern as explained in this article in ComputerWorldUK.  Board-level concerns must be addressed proactively by enterprises.  To do so, enterprises must provide the business justification for such proactive steps needed to address such board-level concerns.

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At The Open Group Conference in Sydney in April, the session on “Which information risks are shaping our lives?” by Stephen Singam, Chief Technology Officer, HP Enterprise Security Services, Australia provides great insight on this topic.  In this session, Singam analyzes the current and emerging information risks while recommending a proactive approach to address them head-on with adversary-centric solutions.

The 3 steps that enterprises must take to proactively address security concerns are below:

Computing the cost of cyber-crime

The HP Ponemon 2012 Cost of Cyber Crime Study revealed that cyber attacks have more than doubled in a three year period with the financial impact increasing by nearly 40 percent. Here are the key takeaways from this research:

  • Cyber-crimes continue to be costly. The average annualized cost of cyber-crime for 56 organizations is $8.9 million per year, with a range of $1.4 million to $46 million.
  • Cyber attacks have become common occurrences. Companies experienced 102 successful attacks per week and 1.8 successful attacks per company per week in 2012.
  • The most costly cyber-crimes are those caused by denial of service, malicious insiders and web-based attacks.

When computing the cost of cyber-crime, enterprises must address direct, indirect and opportunity costs that result from the loss or theft of information, disruption to business operations, revenue loss and destruction of property, plant and equipment. The following phases of combating cyber-crime must also be factored in to comprehensively determine the total cost:

  1. Detection of patterns of behavior indicating an impending attack through sustained monitoring of the enabling infrastructure
  2. Investigation of the security violation upon occurrence to determine the underlying root cause and take appropriate remedial measures
  3. Incident response to address the immediate situation at hand, communicate the incidence of the attack raise all applicable alerts
  4. Containment of the attack by controlling its proliferation across the enterprise
  5. Recovery from the damages incurred as a result of the attack to ensure ongoing business operations based upon the business continuity plans in place

Identifying proactive steps that can be taken to address cyber-crime

  1. “Better get security right,” says HP Security Strategist Mary Ann Mezzapelle in her keynote on Big Data and Security at The Open Group Conference in Newport Beach. Asserting that proactive risk management is the most effective approach, Mezzapelle challenged enterprises to proactively question the presence of shadow IT, data ownership, usage of security tools and standards while taking a comprehensive approach to security end-to-end within the enterprise.
  2. Art Gilliland suggested that learning from cyber criminals and understanding their methods in this ZDNet article since the very frameworks enterprises strive to comply with (such as ISO and PCI) set a low bar for security that adversaries capitalize on.
  3. Andy Ellis discussed managing risk with psychology instead of brute force in his keynote at the 2013 RSA Conference.
  4. At the same conference, in another keynote, world re-knowned game-designer and inventor of SuperBetter, Jane McGonigal suggested the application of the “collective intelligence” that gaming generates can combat security concerns.
  5. In this interview, Bruce Schneier, renowned security guru and author of several books including LIARS & Outliers, suggested “Bad guys are going to invent new stuff — whether we want them to or not.” Should we take a cue from Hollywood and consider the inception of OODA loop into the security hacker’s mind?

The Balancing Act.

Can enterprises afford to take such proactive steps? Or more importantly, can they afford not to?

Enterprises must define their risk management strategy and determine the proactive steps that are best in alignment with their business objectives and information security standards.  This will enable organizations to better assess the cost of execution for such measures.  While the actual cost is likely to vary by enterprise, inaction is not an acceptable alternative.  Like all other critical corporate initiatives, these proactive measures must receive the board-level attention they deserve.

Enterprises must balance the cost of executing such proactive measures against the potential cost of data loss and reputational harm. This will ensure that the right proactive measures are taken with executive support.

How about you?  Has your enterprise taken the steps to assess the cost of cybercrime?  Have you considered various proactive steps to combat cybercrime?  Share your thoughts with me in the comments section below.

NadhanHP Distinguished Technologist, E.G.Nadhan has over 25 years of experience in the IT industry across the complete spectrum of selling, delivering and managing enterprise level solutions for HP customers. He is the founding co-chair for The Open Group SOCCI project and is also the founding co-chair for the Open Group Cloud Computing Governance project. Twitter handle @NadhanAtHP.

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